We document the intergenerational mobility of black and white American men from 1880 through 2000 by building new datasets to study the late 19th and early 20th century and combining them with modern data to cover the mid-to late 20th century. We find large disparities in intergenerational mobility, with white children having far better chances of escaping the bottom of the distribution than black children in every generation. This mobility gap was more important than the gap in parents' status in proximately determining each new generation's racial income gap. Evidence suggests that human capital disparities underpinned the mobility gap.
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In 1870, five years after the Civil War and Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in the United States, African Americans' income per capita was approximately 28 percent of whites' income (Margo 2016) . By 2010, the black/white income ratio had risen to 64 percent, a convergence that remains woefully incomplete and that has far-reaching social ramifications. This paper quantifies the role of intergenerational mobility in determining the relative economic status of black men over more than 100 years, from the end of Reconstruction, when federal troops left the South, to the beginning of the 21 st century. 1 In particular, for several cohorts of father-son pairs, we measure the extent to which black men's relatively poor labor market outcomes reflected their father's disadvantaged economic status as opposed to racial differences in outcomes conditional on fathers' status.
Our data encompass nearly the full span of blacks' struggle for economic and political progress since the Civil War, including the rise of discriminatory "Jim Crow" institutions, the Great Migration of African Americans from the South, and the Civil Rights revolution and its aftermath. Developing an intergenerational perspective over the long run requires information that is simply unavailable in census microdata, which are the foundation for most studies of the U.S. labor market before the 1960s. To overcome the most binding limitations, we have built new intergenerational datasets by linking individuals' census records from 1880 to 1900, and again, for a different set of individuals, from 1910 to 1930. Linked census records are essential in this early period because no other representative datasets contain information on both parents' and children's labor market outcomes (e.g., Ferrie 2005 , Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012 , Long and Ferrie 2013 , Feigenbaum 2017 . 2 For the post-1930 period, we use modern datasets with intergenerational information to complete the portrait of blacks' economic mobility in comparison to whites. Specifically, we rely on the Occupational Changes in a Generation data (OCG), which were collected in 1962 and 1973, and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data (NLSY79), which follow a young cohort from 1979 into adulthood.
Our main metrics of mobility compare each son's estimated position in the national earnings distribution to his father's position in the distribution decades earlier. This rank-based approach follows Dahl and DeLeire (2008) , Mazumder (2014) , and Chetty et al. (2014a,b) . It 3 distribution in the same way as white children with similarly situated parents, the counterfactual black-white gap in their adult outcomes is a small fraction of the actual gap. For perspective, if black children had transitioned in the same way as white children with similarly situated fathers from 1880 to 1900, the median black worker in 1900 would have placed near the 30 th percentile of the national income distribution. This is comparable to the actual rank of the median black male in 2000, a full 100 years later and more than 30 years after the Civil Rights Movement's major legislative accomplishments. In this sense, paraphrasing Otis Duncan (1968) , the inheritance of race rather than the inheritance of poverty has been the first-order determinant of racial disparities since emancipation.
Our work builds on two closely related but distinct economics literatures. First, a burgeoning literature studies the transmission of labor market outcomes across generations (Becker and Tomes 1986 , Solon 1992 , Mazumder 2005 , Black and Devereux 2011 , Long and Ferrie 2013 , Chetty et al. 2014a . 5 Within the intergenerational mobility literature, a much smaller group of studies investigates racial differences in intergenerational income mobility in recent decades (Hertz 2005 , Isaacs 2008 , Bhattacharya and Mazumder 2011 , Mazumder 2014 . Typically, the studies find substantial racial differences in mobility out of the lower end of the income distribution and in maintaining positions higher in the distribution.
Second, a long-standing economics literature studies the evolution of black-white differences in average income and human capital. A number of important studies trace the convergence process far back into history, encountering many of the same data limitations that we confront in this paper (e.g., Higgs 1977 , Smith 1984 , Card and Krueger 1992 , Sacerdote 2005 , Margo 2016 ).
Our goal is to develop evidence that explicitly addresses questions about the interaction of race and intergenerational mobility over a long period of American history, covering a variety of institutional and policy regimes.
The implications of finding large differences in economic mobility over many generations are far reaching. First, although being from a better off family was advantageous for both black and white children relative to others of the same race, it is notable that narrowing the black-white gap in parental earnings in our samples would still leave large gaps in expected income for children. Thus, one-off transfers of income, in and of themselves, might not have 4 made a large and lasting impression on the evolution of the black-white income gap because the groups tended to revert to different means. 6 From this perspective, deeper and more sustained economic, political, and social reform would have been required for black Americans to close the racial gap permanently.
Second, the changes in institutions, policies, and racial animus that did take place over the last century have not led to great improvements in the adult outcomes of poor black children relative to comparably poor white children. One possible proximate explanation is the persistence of gaps in human capital, which have endured despite educational reforms such as school desegregation. Although imperfect, there is suggestive evidence that racial differences in test scores underpinned the racial mobility gap observed in 1930's data, echoing findings from the NLSY79 cohort (Neal and Johnson 1996, Mazumder 2014) . Taken at face value, these findings suggest that sons from black and white families at similar points in the income distribution accumulated substantially different levels of human capital for several generations, with significant and direct implications for racial disparities in labor market outcomes. The deeper explanations for these human capital gaps lie in the history of slavery, discrimination, and racial segregation.
I. Background on Black-White Differences in Economic Status and Mobility

A. Historical Context
In 1880, at the start of our period of study, the overwhelming majority of African Americans were former slaves or directly descended from slaves, and 92 percent lived in the South. 7 Typically, they were poor in terms of both physical and human capital. With few exceptions, there was no mass redistribution of property or compensation paid to former slaves in the wake of the Civil War, despite calls for "40 acres and a mule" (Oubre 1978) . Thus, as we show below, most black men in 1880 were either farm laborers or farmers who did not own land (i.e., sharecroppers or tenant farmers). Most of the rest were unskilled non-farm laborers. The 6 It is conceivable that a mass redistribution of land to freedmen and a more sustained federal presence would have led to a different political economy in the South, a counterfactual that is beyond this paper but that is closer to the "deeper reform" we mention. See Miller (2016) for a study of land redistribution to former slaves in Oklahoma. 7 In 1860, at the time of the last census before the Civil War, about 96 percent of blacks residing in the South were slaves (Ransom 2006) , including Kentucky but not Maryland, Delaware, or Missouri. It is not possible to ascertain from the from post-Civil War censuses whether someone had been a slave. We restrict our sample to Southern blacks, as described later in the paper.
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illiteracy rate was high among former slaves because it was generally forbidden for slaves to learn to read or write. Public school systems were established throughout the South after the Civil War, but schools for black children were separate from those for whites, and racial gaps in school quality widened between 1880 and 1910 (Margo 1990 ), a result of whites' control over both local and state-allocated funding. By 1910, the political disenfranchisement of southern blacks was nearly complete (Kousser 1974) and, therefore, redress through the political system was impossible. Although African Americans did gain in literacy and property ownership over time (Higgs 1982 , Margo 1984 , Margo 1990 , they started from a low base, and the obstacles to their economic advance were formidable (Myrdal 1944 , Ransom and Sutch 1977 , Wright 1986 , Woodman 1995 . Geographic mobility was helpful in this context, but large-scale migration from the South to the North did not begin until World War I. Migration declined during the Great Depression before rising again during World War II and continuing into the 1960s (Vickery 1977 , Vigdor 2002 , Collins and Wanamaker 2014 , Boustan 2016 .
World War II and the 1940s brought significant gains in income for black men relative to whites, in part due to the compression of income distribution (Maloney 1994 , Margo 1995 ). Yet it is the decade following the 1964 Civil Rights Act that stands out in retrospect. The Civil Rights Movement revolutionized race relations in the South by dismantling de jure segregation and discouraging discrimination in labor markets, education, healthcare, voting rights, and public accommodations (Wright 2013 ). Space does not allow a full recounting here, but the blackwhite ratio in men's average wages increased markedly in the 1965-75 timeframe (Freeman 1981, Donohue and Heckman 1991) . The momentum did not continue into the post-1980 period, however, leading scholars to take up the question of "what went wrong?" (e.g., Bound and Freeman 1992) . Bayer and Charles (2016, Appendix Table 2) show that the median earnings gap between black and white native-born men, including those out of the labor force, has widened since 1980, and that the median rank gap has narrowed since 1960, but only slightly. In sum, the pace of convergence has been slow and uneven, large gaps in men's labor market outcomes remain, and the gains of the Civil Rights era have not translated into a sustained path toward economic equality.
B. Closely Related Work on Black-White Differences in Intergenerational Mobility
As mentioned above, a relatively small number of papers in economics study black-white 6 differences in intergenerational economic mobility. Two that are close in spirit to our analysis are Hertz (2005) and Mazumder (2014) , which use modern longitudinal datasets to characterize income mobility patterns in recent decades, from the late 1970s through 2005. 8 They consistently find that black men were less likely than whites to move out of the bottom of the income distribution, conditional on starting at the bottom as children. Blacks were also more likely than whites to fall out of the upper levels of the income distribution, conditional on starting there. Like this paper, these studies highlight the quantitative importance of differences in mobility, as opposed to differences in parental income per se, in transmitting racial disparities over generations. This paper's main contribution relative to Hertz's and Mazumder's work is to expand the scope of investigation, covering from the first post-emancipation generations to the end of the 20th century and developing consistent comparative analyses over eras with different institutional and economic environments.
Margo (2016) also emphasizes the importance of studying intergenerational factors when trying to understand long-run black-white differences in income. He outlines an intergenerational model that seeks to reconcile the slow pace of average income convergence with results from the broader economics literature that focuses on the intergenerational elasticity of income. 9 His model includes race directly in equations determining labor market outcomes and (separately) human capital accumulation. In this framework, racial differences in income may be large and persistent if race and human capital are strongly transmitted across generations or if race strongly affects human capital accumulation (e.g., through social capital channels or discrimination in access to educational resources), all of which is consistent with American history.
There is also a large sociology literature on intergenerational mobility, some of which focuses on racial disparities and uses data that we examine for the mid-20 th century. Duncan (1968) Hout (1984) finds that the black men who experienced occupational upgrades during the 1960s tended to come from better off backgrounds in terms of their fathers' occupations. Our methodology allows us to study these occupational mobility results for two mid-century cohorts in terms of relative income mobility and to place them in long-run perspective.
II. Data and Measurement
A. Historical and Modern Datasets for Studying Economic Mobility
As mentioned in the introduction, we have built new datasets of linked census records that cover one set of father-son pairs observed in 1880 (providing the father's labor market outcome) and 1900 (for the son's outcome) and a second set of father-son pairs observed in 1910 and 1930. Since these datasets are new, we introduce them here at some length and describe them in more detail in the data appendix. The modern datasets that we use to complete the longrun portrait of mobility, the OCG surveys for 1962 and 1973 (Blau et al. 1999 ) and the NLSY79 data, are more familiar to scholars. We spend less space on their basic description here, but we highlight some issues of comparability between the historical and modern samples.
To build the 1880 to 1900 linked dataset, we started with the 1-percent public use sample of the 1880 Census of Population (Ruggles et al. 2010 One downside of the historical samples in comparison with true longitudinal data is the possibility of mismatches in the link between fathers and sons across census years. The appendix contains both a sensitivity analysis based on the quality of the underlying intercensal match and simulations to quantify the bias under an assumed rate of mismatch (Bailey et al. 2016 ). The paper's conclusions are not sensitive to these adjustments.
Many of the fathers in the 1880-based dataset were farmers. In the absence of further information, they would occupy a single occupational category, leaving only race and region of residence as income score differentiators. To learn more about their economic status, we conducted another linking exercise to locate them in the manuscripts of the 1880 Census of Agriculture, which were recorded and stored separately from the Census of Population manuscripts. 13 We then transcribed key information about their farms. We focus on whether the farmer owned his farm, as this was a major distinction in economic and legal status at the time and is a distinction we can also make in 1900, 1910, and 1930 . We assume that men who reported themselves as a farmer in the population census but could not be linked to an actual Maryland, Delaware, and Washington D.C., although in the "Census South," are not included in our data. 11 percent of sons in the original sample are dropped because of missing fathers in 1880; 12 percent are dropped for this reason in the 1910 dataset. 12 See the data appendix for details on the matching process. The final match rate was 26 percent, 13 Linking them often entailed searching "by hand" through microfilmed records that are organized by location. We were able to use Ancestry.com database searches for Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Microfilm searches of the original Census of Agriculture manuscripts were performed by hand for Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and West Virginia residents. In the Census of Agriculture manuscripts, we located 82 percent of the white fathers who reported their occupation as "farmer" in the population census and 76 percent of black farmers.
9 farm in the agricultural census did not, in fact, own the land underlying their agricultural production. Next, we use the NLSY79, which began with over 12,000 males and females who were age 14 to 22 in 1979. Respondents were interviewed each year until 1994 and then every other year. The NLSY79 data are similar to the OCG data in that they report the father's (or household head's) occupation when the respondent was 14 years old based on a retrospective question posed at the start of the survey. We focus on males for consistency with the earlier datasets. The data appendix provides additional details on the OCG and NLSY79 samples.
Differences in data structure pose a challenge when comparing the historical samples to the OCG or NLSY data. Because most of our analyses compare black-white differences in mobility within samples, the incongruities across datasets are not a paramount concern, but we want to highlight the issues here for clarity. 17 First, in the historical datasets, we see the sons in the labor market exactly 20 years after we see the fathers. But in the OCG and NLSY data, the reference is to the father's occupation when the son was 16 or 14 years old, which could be any number of years prior to the survey (e.g., for a 30-year old respondent in the OCG survey, the question pertains to 14 years prior). There is no way to make the datasets perfectly comparable Therefore, it is appropriate to use the full scope of the OCG and NLSY data for the post-war analyses. It is straightforward to check the sensitivity of key results to restricting the samples to men who were born in the South; we provide this information in the appendix.
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A third issue relates to the reference parent. In the historical samples, approximately 90 percent of sons reside with fathers or stepfathers, and we base our analyses on this group. Given that women's labor force participation and occupations were recorded inconsistently and with considerable error in these samples, it would be difficult to impute income to female-headed households. The OCG and NLSY79 surveys asked respondents about the adults with whom they resided at age 16 or 14, respectively, and about the adults' occupations at that juncture. We use these responses to assign household income scores based on the father's occupation if the father was present and on the mother's occupation if the father was not present. Alternatively, the appendix includes a sensitivity check that uses an "other male head"-based score for those living with their mother and another adult male. It makes little difference to our results. A small number of individuals who resided with neither their mother nor father at age 16 or 14 are dropped from the analysis. 19 For brevity, when we refer to "fathers" throughout the rest of this paper, readers should recognize that in the historical samples we mean fathers or stepfathers, and in the modern samples we mean fathers or household-head mothers.
B. Assigning Income Scores and Ranks
In all the intergenerational samples we examine across a 120-year period, we can observe an individual's occupation, race, region of residence, and gender. We assign income scores based on the average earnings of individuals in the same occupation, race, region of residence, and gender cell, drawn from the decennial census that is closest in timing and that has earnings information. This approach is similar in spirit to the often-used occscore variable from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2015) , which is based on occupation-specific earnings in 1950. But the scoring used here has much more flexibility. Income assignments that would be based on fewer than 50 underlying census observations are supplanted with scores based on a race-and occupationspecific national average (not region-specific) or, if necessary, based on a race-specific one-digit occupation (rather than the 3-digit code). percent of the NLSY79 sample. 20 Björklund and Jäntti (2000) provide an insightful discussion of how the economics and sociology literatures on mobility have evolved in parallel. Mazumder and Acosta (2015) provide a comparison of occupation and income-based results with modern data, with particular attention to issues of life-cycle bias and measurement error. An alternative approach, which we do not pursue here, is to quantify occupational mobility per se using broad, unordered occupation categories and Altham statistics, as described in Long and Ferrie (2013) . only to the extent that the cells change rank. 23 A second limitation is that there is no within-cell variation in score assignments, whereas there is, of course, within-cell variation in true income.
For this reason, distributions of scores do not mimic micro-level distributions of earnings.
We convert assigned income scores into rankings in the national income distribution in each year. Using the national distribution as a reference point is useful for several reasons. First, we are primarily interested in documenting economic status relative to the entire population, not 21 We use perquisite rates inferred from U.S. Department of Agriculture (1957) measures of cash wages and non-cash compensation. See the data appendix for a more detailed description. 22 The 1950 decennial census asks income only of "sample line" individuals, and we quickly encounter sample size problems in the income assignment methodology described in the data appendix. 23 The income scoring based on 1940's income distribution versus 1960's is highly correlated even though the "Great Compression" occurred between these dates (Goldin and Margo 1992) . For the sons in the 1910-30 sample, the correlation coefficient is 0.93. A regression of sons' ranks with an alternative 1960-based scoring on sons' ranks with 1940-based scoring has a slope of 0.94 (s.e.=0.003) and R-squared of 0.88. Because some information from 1960's income distribution is carried over into the 1940 income assignments (see the data appendix), the scores are not completely independent, however.
13 mobility within subgroups defined by race or region. 24 For this purpose, a common, national basis for comparison is most useful. Second, measuring blacks' status relative to the national distribution anchors the discussion in an important historical fact: southern blacks were remarkably crowded into the lowest deciles of the national income distribution in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Thus, studying the frequency and correlates of upward mobility from the bottom is critical to understanding the course of black economic progress. Third, by focusing on position in the distribution, we would characterize a father-son pair that maintains the same rank as neither up-nor downwardly mobile. We find this property appropriate given the paper's motivation, which is grounded in the relative status of blacks rather than, say, their absolute level of income per capita.
To rank sons and fathers for the historical samples, we first apply the income score assignment methods described above to nationally representative cross-sectional samples for 1880, 1900, 1910, and 1930 Underpinning these cross-sectional distributions are occupation-based income assignments, and we can see how groups line up based on broad occupational categories and
race. This provides a check on whether the income assignments result in sensible rankings. It also shows how the prevalence of occupational groups varied over time and across races, though we emphasize that the micro-level income assignments are based on detailed (not broad) occupational categories. Table 1 , Panel A reports income ranks for southern fathers in 1880 and in 1910 and for all fathers in the OCG and NLSY79 samples. We focus on fathers in these tables for ease of exposition. Because farming occupations ("Farmer, owns" and "Farmer, does not own") and white-collar occupations ("White collar, professionals" and "White collar, managerial and clerical") become relatively less and more prevalent over time, respectively, we collapse the former into "All Farmers" in the modern samples and the latter into "All White Collar" in the historical samples.
First, we note that the relative rank of the broad categories matches our priors. Whitecollar and skilled blue-collar workers are relatively highly ranked within race; the "agricultural ladder" appears monotonic in income from farm laborers to non-owner farmers to owner operators; blacks earn less than whites within the occupational categories; and the black-white differences in rank are larger at higher levels of skill. Second, the average rank for black fathers in the historical datasets is below the 10 th percentile of the national distribution, and black fathers in the South appear to have made no progress in terms of average rank between 1880 and 1910.
Other studies have found growth in the black-white ratio of mean income in the pre-1900 period.
Margo (2016), for example, estimates a rise in the ratio from 0.28 to 0.32 from 1870 to 1900. It is possible for the ratio of mean income to rise without a substantial change in the average black rank, but it is also possible that such growth came from blacks' relative gains within or between 15 occupation-region cells, which are not captured in the historical scoring described above.
For the latter part of the 20 th century, when the data are no longer constrained to southern fathers, the average rank of black fathers (observed circa 1950) is substantially higher than in the earlier cohorts, though just barely above the 10 th percentile in the 1962 OCG. In large part, this is due to the smaller share of black men in low-paying agricultural occupations, an outcome at least partially attributable to inter-regional migration. In the 1973 OCG sample, the average rank for black fathers increases to the 16 th percentile, as even fewer were reported to have held agricultural occupations and as average ranks for black men within non-farm categories increased relative to the previous cohort. Finally, the NLSY79 sample, which measures fathers' or mothers' status in the early 1970s, shows strong evidence of black fathers increasing employment in white collar and higher-skilled blue collar occupations, but also a sizable increase in white fathers' employment in professional and managerial positions. The overall result is a rise in the average of black fathers' ranking to approximately the 18 th percentile.
III. Black-White Differences in Intergenerational Income Mobility Since 1880
In the analysis that follows, we document intergenerational economic mobility for each cohort of sons in our sample. By "mobility," we mean the movement of sons up or down the percentiles of the national income distribution of similarly aged men relative to the position their fathers held in the distribution of all fathers decades earlier. As mentioned earlier, this rankbased approach is similar in spirit to recent work by Dahl and DeLeire (2008 ), Mazumder (2014 ), and Chetty et al. (2014a , and it reflects whether men "get ahead" or "fall behind"
relative to their peers from one generation to the next.
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First, we show the share of black and white sons who rose in the ranks relative to their father's position-this is "upward rank mobility," as termed by Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011) . When arranged by father's decile, this provides a simple comparison of upward and downward mobility rates for similarly situated children, but it does not capture the magnitude of 26 Readers might also be interested in the distribution of absolute real income or wealth, which is related to but distinct from the study of intergenerational mobility emphasized here. For efforts to measure race-specific levels of income or wealth prior to 1940, we refer readers to Ransom and Sutch (1977) , Higgs (1977 and 1982) , and Margo (1984) . Alternatively, the historical and sociological literatures on intergenerational mobility often focus on father-son transitions between broad occupational categories. In the appendix, we report transition matrices across broad occupational categories for each of the father-son samples, and on occasion we refer to especially noteworthy patterns in the text below.
the differences in the sons' adult outcomes. We next use descriptive regressions to characterize the expected rank of sons as a function of fathers' rank and race. The racial gap is large, and it remains so even when a large number of additional background variables are included in the regressions. Finally, to illustrate the consequences of racial differences in mobility, we estimate counterfactual distributions of black sons' income score ranks, in which they experience the net mobility patterns of white sons who were similarly situated in terms of fathers' ranks.
A. Upward Rank Mobility Measures
Decile-to-decile transition matrices, a common method for displaying rank mobility, provide a rich characterization of mobility patterns, but with two race categories and five cohorts of fathers and sons, they are unwieldy for presentation here. 27 Moreover, as Bhattacharya and
Mazumder (2011) 27 We provide decile-to-decile transition matrices for reference in Appendix II. 28 More formally, , where represents rank of son or father; and represent the lower and upper bounds of some interval of percentiles (e.g., spanning the first decile of the fathers' distribution); and is equal to or greater than zero. 29 Bootstrapped standard errors based on 50 draws of 50. As a result, plots are limited to deciles of fathers' income score rank with more than 50 observations. 30 The unconditional rates of upward rank mobility for blacks were comparable to those of whites, if not higher. But this simply reflects that black fathers were concentrated at the bottom of the distribution and that upward mobility rates naturally decline as the father's rank rises, hence the downward slopes in Figures 2a-e. upward mobility, implying lower rates of downward mobility because few maintained exactly the same rank as their parent.
In the historical samples, the plots for African Americans cover only a short range of fathers' potential income deciles, reflecting the overwhelming concentration of black fathers at the bottom of the national income distribution. (We do not plot results for cells containing fewer than 50 observations.) For those with the lowest earning fathers (1st decile), between 72 percent (1880-1900) and 90 (1910-1930) In 1990 (NLSY79 data), racial differences in upward rank mobility appear less pronounced than in the earlier samples, particularly at higher deciles of fathers' income scores. But the differences are still quite large, and they appear to widen with age. That is, results for the NLSY79 sons observed in 2000, rather than 1990, show larger racial differences conditional on fathers' income scores. (See Appendix III.) Mazumder (2014) also finds large racial differences in URM in the NLSY79 data using observed income rather than occupation-based scores.
Consistent with these results, Table 2 
B. Expected Outcomes Conditional on Father's Status
In this section, we use simple descriptive regressions to characterize the racial gap in sons' outcomes conditional on fathers' ranks. Then, we explore whether additional observable characteristics of fathers, sons, and households can account for the racial gap. 31 The baseline "full sample" regressions include men observed in their 20s and 30s; we also report estimates that restrict the sample to sons observed at age 30 or higher, allowing more time for their careers to unfold (Grawe 2006, Haider and Solon 2006) .
Panel A of Table 3 presents coefficients on an indicator variable for black sons in each cohort, conditioning only on the fathers' rank. For sons observed in 1900 and 1930, blacks ranked between 20 and 23 percentiles lower than whites in the "full sample" regressions; the gaps are even larger in the "30+ year old" sample. In the later cohorts (in samples that are national in scope), the black-white rank gaps conditional on fathers' status were 27, 25, and 19 percentiles, respectively. The NLSY cohort of sons can be re-examined in 2000, and the racial gap is approximately one percentile larger (not shown in Table 3 ; see Appendix III).
In Panel B of Table 3 , we add controls for fathers' human capital and for other conditions in the home when the son was young. In the historical samples, we observe the literacy rate of fathers when sons were observed in their households (1880 and 1910) . In the OCG and NLSY samples, we add fixed effects for fathers' educational attainment, measured in years of completed schooling. We also control for whether the family's home was an urban, rural nonfarm, or farm residence when the son was co-resident with his parents. Including the combined set of additional characteristics reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on race by no more than 1 point (1900 cohort), and sometimes widens differences compared to Panel A (1962, 1973, and 1990 cohorts) . Similar results obtain for the subsample of older sons (aged 30-37).
In Panel C, we add controls for the age of sons at the time their occupation is observed, as well as fixed effects for state or region of residence in childhood, retaining the covariates from Panel B as well. In the historical samples, the childhood location fixed effects are at the state level, whereas for 1962 and 1973 cohorts they are at the region level, and for the 1990 cohort 31 Conditional measures of upward rank mobility are an alternative way to measure the importance of additional observable characteristics, but the main conclusions are more easily interpreted using conditional regression specifications.
19 they are at the South/non-South level, reflecting constraints inherent to the datasets. 32 This specification controls for any racial differences in the age structure of the underlying samples as well as differences in place of origin that may affect labor market outcomes. The results are quite similar to those in the preceding panels.
Specifications in Panel D also include controls for sons' schooling and the presence of both parents in the childhood household. In the historical samples, school attendance (for those over age 5) and childhood literacy (for those over age 10 in the base year) are the only measures of education, and using them reduces the sample size relative to previous panels. From 1962 forward, we see completed grades for all sons. For all the samples, we observe whether their mother and father were present in the childhood household. Again, adding the controls has only a small effect on the size of the racial gap in income rank relative to the parsimonious regression in Panel A, despite a growing racial difference in the number of single parent households and the rising level of blacks' educational attainment. In unreported results, we replace the continuous measure of fathers' income rank with fixed effects for income rank deciles to allow for a nonlinear relationship. This change matters little for Table 3 's results.
In addition to the stark racial differences in expected outcomes, Table 3 also highlights a consistently positive and statistically significant relationship between father's rank and son's rank. Most of the slope coefficients in Table 3 father's and son's rank is apparent in both the white and black populations at all points in timeit was helpful to be born to a better off black family in 1910 rather than to an impoverished one, despite the many barriers to advancement. But the intercept differences between whites and blacks were large and persistent, as reflected in the BLACK coefficients. In other words, both populations show evidence of mean reversion, but toward much different means throughout US history.
For additional perspective, Figure 3 illustrates these differences with the raw data, binned 32 Moving to county over state fixed effects for the earliest cohorts makes for slightly larger racial differences.
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by fathers' income percentile and averaged, for easier viewing. Here, we allow both the intercept and slope to vary by race and by son's cohort. Recalling that black fathers are concentrated below the 30 th percentile in every dataset, the economic significance of the intercept difference is immediately clear. We include the NLSY79 cohort of sons observed in both 1990 and 2000 to show that the relatively large slope depicted for black men in 1990 is somewhat sensitive to the age at observation; by 2000, the slope for black sons had fallen and was similar to that observed in the 1973 OCG data.
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C. Robustness of Baseline Estimates
The racial differences in intergenerational mobility documented above may be sensitive to features of the underlying data or to choices made in the data construction process. To evaluate the robustness of our results, we first address two common sources of bias in the intergenerational mobility literature, lifecycle bias and attenuation bias due to measurement error, before moving on to income assignment assumptions specific to our setting. Each of these concerns is addressed in detail in Appendix IV.
Lifecycle Bias. A common concern in the empirical intergenerational mobility literature is that father-to-son income correlations tend to vary depending on the ages at which fathers' and sons' incomes are measured. This, in turn, may confound comparisons across samples that observe men at different ages (e.g., see Haider and Solon 2006, Mazumder 2015) . We observe sons when they are relatively young compared to what is considered ideal (around age 40) when using modern data and annual income. We acknowledge this limitation but are somewhat less concerned with this issue for two reasons. First, the income scores reflect average income for men in that occupation over all ages (for a given race/region), rather than actual annual income, which tends to change substantially with age. Second, we emphasize black-white comparisons of rank within datasets where black and white men are observed with similar age distributions.
So, biases that affect blacks and whites equally would, in a sense, difference out. 34 Still, it is useful to (a) test the robustness of the paper's main conclusions to samples of sons measured 33 There is some attrition between the 1990 and 2000 observations of the NLSY79 cohort. Restricting to a balanced sample has no effect on the calculated slopes from Figure 3 . 34 However, if black men progress through occupational hierarchies at slower rates than their white peers over the lifecycle, then we are likely to understate racial differences in sons' status by observing them at relatively young ages. We therefore test the robustness of the paper's main conclusions to samples of sons measured closer to age 40. These results, found in the appendix, confirm the paper's main conclusions.
closer to age 40 and (b) utilize the NLSY79 panel structure to capture sons at two points in time, 1990 and 2000. These additional results confirm the paper's main conclusions.
Measurement Error. A second common concern in the modern literature is that a single year, or even several years, of fathers' annual income might be a noisy measure of permanent income, tending to attenuate measures of intergenerational persistence and to overstate intergenerational mobility. In this regard, our occupation-based measure of fathers' status may have some advantages over annual income. It may hew closer to an individual's long-term labor market status. Further, in the historical samples, census enumerators collected occupational information even for those who were temporarily unemployed, thereby avoiding temporary zero income measures. Although the occupation-based income scores mask permanent individuallevel productivity differences within race/occupation/region cells, which is a limitation, it is at the same time unlikely that many of the relatively poor families we observe (e.g., unskilled laborers) were merely having a temporary negative shock to their status or that the affluent families (e.g., professionals) were having a temporary positive shock.
Year of Income Assignment.
A concern that is more specific to this study is that the historical samples all rely heavily on the 1940 census data for income assignments, while the 1962, 1973, and 1990 cohort results rely on contemporary census data for income assignments, as described above and in the data appendix. There is not much that can be done to improve upon these historical assignments; the main alternatives for wage information prior to 1940 pertain to selected urban samples while our historical samples are concentrated in the rural South. But we can assess the sensitivity of our results in the historical samples using 1960 as an alternative census reference year. Our main estimates are unaffected by this sensitivity test.
Parent Definitions. The appendix also contains evidence regarding the sensitivity of our results to definitions of "parent" in the intergenerational mobility estimates. Specifically, we examine whether our conclusions are altered by substituting the income scores of co-resident males, stepfathers or otherwise, for that of the mother in the 1962, 1973, and 1990 cohorts in cases where the father is not present. Our results are robust to these substitutions.
IV. Counterfactuals
Given the racial differences in mobility conditional on fathers' income documented above, it is natural to ask how far such differences go toward explaining differences in the 22 distributions of sons' labor market outcomes. Figure 4 shows actual and counterfactual distributions of black sons' income rank, where the counterfactual allows black sons to experience the transition patterns of their white peers conditional on parental income score.
These kernel densities are smoothed distributions of discrete underlying data, reflecting the occupation-region-race-gender-based income score assignment process. 35 We estimate the counterfactual using re-weighting techniques developed in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) .
In essence, we up-weight white observations who are similarly situated to blacks and downweight white observations who are not; the result is a counterfactual sample that has fathers distributed like blacks but has the mobility patterns of whites.
The counterfactuals indicate that differences in transition patterns are the primary "proximate cause" of racial inequality in each generation of sons. That is, for each cohort, To summarize the importance of differences in mobility patterns, we calculate standard measures of distance and dissimilarity between black and white sons' actual and counterfactual distributions. We find that a dissimilarity index, based on ventiles of sons' ranks, falls by between 66 and 81 percent when black sons experience white transition rates. That is, relative to the actual dissimilarity index value, the counterfactual index value is much smaller for every cohort. When we use adaptive kernel density estimates (discretized into 100 bins) and Hellinger 
V. The Role of Human Capital Accumulation
The mechanisms that underlie racial differences in intergenerational mobility and the slow pace of black-white convergence are difficult to pinpoint. Although the datasets we examine contain fairly rich background information by historical standards, we found in Table 3 that controlling for observables beyond the father's rank does little to narrow the black-white gap in sons' outcomes. However, Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011) and Mazumder (2014) show that conditioning on sons' Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores narrows black-white differences in upward rank mobility in the NLSY79 cohort. 37 Using the earnings ranks that form the basis of this paper's analyses, we too find that controlling for AFQT in the NLSY79 substantially reduces the coefficient on race in descriptive regressions similar to those in Table   3 . For instance, adding fixed effects for AFQT percentile to a parsimonious regression that controls for fathers' rank reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on race to -10.6 in 1990 (down from -18.9 in the parsimonious regression without AFQT for the same sample.)
If human capital gaps were a strong determinant of conditional income rank gaps circa 1990, what, then, of the earliest cohorts in this study? For these cohorts, slavery's legacy in 36 Calculated using IPUMS 2000 Census 5% sample, ranking white and black men who were not in school, age 25-59. 37 The AFQT was administered to the NLSY79 cohort in 1980 regardless of whether they joined the military. See Neal and Johnson (1996) for further description of the AFQT in the context of a study of black-white income differences.
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terms of literacy and the denial of education was still fresh-directly impacting their parents and grandparents-and even though southern states established public schools during Reconstruction, the schools were strictly segregated and diverged in quality. By 1880, in most places in the South, children in poor black families and poor white families experienced not only different school environments in terms of physical quality, days per term, and teacher quality (Margo 1990 ), but also different peers and different expectations regarding their future economic prospects. In short, controls for fathers' income score ranks and other family and community covariates in Table 3 do not capture the full set of potentially relevant differences in sons' opportunities for human capital investment. (Ferrie, Rolf, and Troesken 2012) . As with AFQT, we interpret the AGCT test scores as the cumulative result of educational experiences in and out of school, including both substantive knowledge and test-taking skills.
We merge the test score information, by race, region, and occupation, with our 1910-30 dataset.
Blacks' imputed test scores are lower than whites' on average, and the test scores are strongly, positively correlated with the sons' earnings rank. In a parsimonious regression that controls for fathers' rank, adding flexible controls for AGCT score reduces the race coefficient to -6.8 (from -22.7).
39
Thus, in both historical and modern datasets, black-white differences in test scores are strongly connected to differences in economic mobility. Human capital differences cannot fully account for the racial mobility gap, but their empirical relevance is clear. Understanding the origins of human capital gaps and reducing their intergenerational transmission may be a critical 38 When there were fewer than 50 observations in a race-by-region-by-occupation cell, we moved to race-byoccupation cells. 39 The race coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The regression includes AGCT fixed effects after rounding imputed AGCT to nearest integer. Restricting the sample to the range of AGCT scores that includes both white and black men, the coefficient on race is -5.7.
step in narrowing the racial gap in mobility and, ultimately, income and material well-being.
VI. Conclusion
After Our results suggest that racial differences in intergenerational mobility have been the most important proximate cause of black-white income inequality from the Civil War until today. Counterfactuals that equalize mobility across races, conditional on parents' status, go a long way toward equalizing distributions of earnings scores in every generation we examine.
Simple measures of dissimilarity or distance between earnings score distributions fall by more than half when black children are allowed to have the intergenerational mobility patterns of white children. In contrast, the actual rate of black-white convergence has been regrettably slow and is far from complete.
Analyses for the early and late 20 th century suggest that weaker human capital accumulation in black children, conditional on parents' economic status, has hindered the pace of intergenerational convergence in labor market outcomes. Although the barriers have varied over time, structural impediments to black children's accumulation of human capital have been a long-standing feature of U.S. history, most obviously through slavery and then a century of separate and unequal schools. Even after school desegregation in the 1960s and 1970s, residential segregation, which peaked around 1970 (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999, Logan and Parman 2017), continued to limit black children's exposure to high social capital environments 
